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A TORT REPORT: CHRIST v. EXXON MOBIL 
AND THE EXTENSION OF THE DISCOVERY 
RULE TO THIRD-PARTY REPRESENTATIVES 
OF DECEDENTS IN WRONGFUL DEATH  
AND SURVIVAL SUITS 
JEREMY MCMANUS* 
Abstract: On June 23, 2015, the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed repre-
sentatives of deceased employees of a tire manufacturing facility to use the 
“discovery rule” to extend the statute of limitations for their wrongful death 
and survival suits associated with the decedents’ forced benzene exposure at 
the facility, provided they could show the information necessary for making 
their claims had not been available upon diligent effort within the statute’s 
timeframe. The majority reasoned that public policy is in favor of allowing 
meritorious claims to be heard, there is no significant difference between di-
rect victims and representatives to render an extension untenable, and the 
preservation of existing barriers to stale claims being heard will allow for the 
smooth extension of the discovery rule. This Comment argues in favor of the 
majority’s approach, as it best protects the ability of all tort victims to recover 
damages they are owed. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 13, 2006, former employees and representatives of deceased 
employees of an Eau Claire, Wisconsin tire manufacturing facility filed suit 
against parties associated with operating the facility alleging injuries from 
forced benzene exposure.1 Those plaintiffs who were personal representa-
tives of decedents made their claims through survival suits, whereby they 
“stood in the shoes” of the decedents to recover damages benefitting the 
decedents’ estates.2 These plaintiffs also filed wrongful death suits for their 
own injuries stemming from the loss of the decedents.3 
After the resolution of various pre-trial matters, the remaining defend-
ants filed a motion on March 5, 2012 to dismiss the complaints of eight of 
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 1 Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 866 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Wis. 2015). 
 2 Id. at 607, 613 (quoting Estate of Merrill v. Jerrick, 605 N.W.2d 645, 650 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
 3 Id. at 608. 
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the plaintiffs who represented decedents.4 The defendants argued that the 
plaintiffs had filed their wrongful death and survival suits after the running 
of the applicable three-year statute of limitations provided for by Section 
893.54(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes.5 According to the defendants, wrongful 
death and survival suits accrue when the decedent dies and do not accrue 
pursuant to the “discovery rule” that is applicable to injured parties them-
selves, whereby a claim does not accrue until the harmed party could have, 
through diligent effort, obtained the knowledge necessary to file a claim.6 
On April 30, 2012, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court granted the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss because the court found that the discovery rule 
does not apply to wrongful death and survival claims made by third-party 
representatives of decedents.7 On February 12, 2014, the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals summarily reversed the Eau Claire County Circuit Court, find-
ing that the claims of the eight plaintiff-representatives accrued within the 
statute of limitations provided that they could show upon remand that they 
were diligent in finding the information necessary to file their claims.8 After 
the Court of Appeals denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration, the 
defendants appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.9 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on June 
23, 2015, holding that the discovery rule applies to third-party representa-
tives of decedents in wrongful death and survival suits.10 A majority of the 
Supreme Court stated that the discovery rule that already exists for regular 
plaintiffs allowing the extension of statutes of limitation should extend to 
third-party plaintiffs because there is strong public policy in favor of hear-
ing meritorious claims and there is no significant difference between the 
two types of plaintiffs that would render such an extension untenable.11 The 
majority also pointed out that this decision will not open the floodgates for 
courts to have to hear stale claims because its decision leaves intact several 
other existing barriers which also work to prevent the progression of stale 
claims.12 The dissent, however, emphasized that the statute of limitations 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. at 606. 
 5 Id. at 606–07; see WIS. STAT. § 893.54 (2013–2014). 
 6 See Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 605; see also Accrues, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 
1990) (defining “accrues” as when a suit may be maintained thereon, and stating that the law in 
this regard differs from state to state and by nature of action (for example, type of breach of con-
tract, tort, etc.)). 
 7 See Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 607. 
 8 Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2012AP1493, (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2014) (order re-
manding the case to the circuit court to determine if the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ 
claims after extension of the discovery rule). 
 9 See Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 607. 
 10 See id. at 606. 
 11 See id. at 610, 612. 
 12 See id. at 615–16. 
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under Section 893.54 of the Wisconsin Statutes is harm-based and that the 
harm giving rise to wrongful death and survival claims always occurs upon 
the death of the decedent.13 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the factual and procedural history 
of Christ. Part II discusses the majority’s decision to extend the discovery 
rule to allow the claims of third-party representatives of decedents to accrue 
when they could not have found all of the information necessary to file their 
claims upon diligent effort. Finally, Part III agrees with the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court’s extension of the discovery rule to third-party representatives 
of decedents because it best preserves the legal right of all tort victims to 
recover damages resulting from those torts. 
I. ACCRUAL OF WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS 
On July 13, 2006, several past employees, as well as representatives of 
deceased past employees, of an Eau Claire, Wisconsin tire manufacturing 
facility run by the Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, Inc. filed a joint law-
suit alleging injuries as a result of employees’ forced exposure to benzene 
and products containing benzene at the facility.14 The lawsuit alleged that 
those associated with operating the facility were liable for the benzene-
caused injuries due to negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn.15 
Those plaintiffs who were third-party representatives of decedents made 
their claims by way of survival suits, which allow those representatives to 
“stand in the shoes” of decedents to make claims for the benefit of the de-
cedents’ estates. 16  Additionally, these third-party representatives brought 
separate wrongful death actions to recover for their own injuries resulting 
from the loss of the decedents.17 
After the addition of nine plaintiffs and three defendants on December 
28, 2007, several pre-trial motions were filed.18 Among these pre-trial mo-
tions was the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims of eight of the plain-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See id. at 618 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting); see also WIS. STAT. § 893.54 (2013–2014). 
 14 Complaint, Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 06CV420 (Wis. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2006); see CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CHEMICAL EMERGENCIES: FACT SHEET BENZENE (Aug. 29, 
2005), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/benzene/basics/pdf/facts.pdf [perma.cc/HH68-R44X] (explaining 
that long-term benzene exposure, of more than one year, most seriously causes leukemia, which is 
cancer of the blood-forming organs). Non-lethal effects of long-term benzene exposure include 
harm to bone marrow and the immune system, excessive bleeding, irregular menstrual periods, 
and decreased ovary and red blood cell size. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
supra. 
 15 Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 866 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Wis. 2015). 
 16 Id. at 613. 
 17 Id. at 608. 
 18 Id. at 606; Amended Complaint, Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 06CV420 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 28, 2007). 
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tiffs who represented decedents for failure to file their wrongful death and 
survival claims within the three-year statute of limitations included in Sec-
tion 893.54(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes.19 Though the defendants agreed 
that injured parties may use the “discovery rule” to enlarge the statute of 
limitations when the information necessary to file their claims could not have 
been found upon diligent effort within that period, the defendants nonetheless 
contended that the discovery rule is inapplicable to wrongful death and sur-
vival claims made by third-party representatives of decedents.20 
On April 30, 2012, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court granted the de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss the claims of the eight plaintiff-representatives, 
finding that the discovery rule was not applicable to third-party representa-
tives of decedents in wrongful death and survival suits.21 Instead, the circuit 
court ruled that the statute of limitations in wrongful death and survival 
suits brought by third-party representatives of decedents begins running at 
the death of the decedent.22 Thus, the circuit court found that the eight 
plaintiff-representatives could not satisfy the three year statute of limitations 
required under the statute because the deaths of the decedents occurred over 
three years before they filed their claims.23 
The eight plaintiff-representatives then appealed to the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals, which summarily reversed the circuit court on February 
12, 2014.24 The Court of Appeals held that the discovery rule is applicable 
to wrongful death and survival claims made by third-party representatives 
of decedents.25 In so holding, the court found that the eight plaintiff-rep-
resentatives could satisfy the statute of limitations upon showing that they 
were diligent in finding the information necessary for making their claims.26 
The defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of 
Appeals denied, and the defendants then appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.27 
On June 23, 2015, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the Court of 
Appeals, finding that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death and sur-
vival claims made by third-party representatives of decedents.28 The Wis-
                                                                                                                           
 19 WIS. STAT. § 893.54 (2013–2014); Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 606–07. 
 20 See Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 605. 
 21 Id. at 607. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2012AP1493 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2014) (order re-
manding the case to the circuit court to determine if the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ 
claims after extension of the discovery rule). 
 26 See id. 
 27 Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 607. 
 28 Id. at 605. 
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consin Supreme Court then remanded the case to the circuit court so that it 
could determine whether the eight plaintiffs were diligent in finding the in-
formation necessary to make their claims.29 
II. THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT’S EXTENSION OF THE DISCOVERY 
RULE TO THIRD-PARTY REPRESENTATIVES OF DECEDENTS  
IN WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL SUITS 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ exten-
sion of the discovery rule to third-party representatives of decedents in 
wrongful death and survival suits because it found that plaintiffs who repre-
sent third parties are not different enough from direct plaintiffs to sufficient-
ly frustrate the underlying policy considerations which gave rise to the dis-
covery rule.30 The opinion, written by Justice David T. Prosser and joined 
by a majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, held that the discovery rule 
can apply to wrongful death and survival suits filed by third-party repre-
sentatives of decedents because the benefits of the application outweigh 
whatever detriments would be created.31 
A. Extending the Discovery Rule to Third-Party Representatives of 
Decedents Who File Wrongful Death and Survival Claims 
The Wisconsin legislature and the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognize 
that damages caused by deaths can extend to those beyond the deceased, 
such as family members.32 For this reason, Wisconsin statutorily authorizes 
wrongful death and survival claims so that representatives of deceased tort 
victims can recover the full amount of damages caused by the tortfeasor.33 
Taking each in turn, wrongful death claims in Wisconsin are brought 
pursuant to Section 895.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes.34 Wrongful death 
claims are derivative, meaning that their viability entirely depends upon the 
hypothetical ability of decedents to bring suit had they not died.35 Wrongful 
death actions extend to personal losses that the representatives suffered 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See id. at 606. 
 30 See Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 866 N.W.2d 602, 612 (Wis. 2015). 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. at 608. 
 33 See id. at 608–09 (clarifying that wrongful death claims are brought pursuant to Section 
895.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes and that survival suits are brought pursuant to Section 895.01 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes); see also WIS. STAT. §§ 895.01, 895.03 (2013–2014). 
 34 WIS. STAT. § 895.03. 
 35 Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 609 (giving the example that a decedent’s representative could not 
file a wrongful death claim if the decedent waived liability for the conduct that resulted in the 
decedent’s death because the decedent would have been barred from bringing a claim for non-fatal 
injuries). 
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from the loss of the decedent, such as the loss of society and companion-
ship.36 Additionally, Section 893.54(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes subjects 
wrongful death actions to a three-year statute of limitations.37 
In extending the discovery rule to allow for third-party representatives 
of decedents to enlarge the statute’s three-year statute of limitations for 
wrongful death claims when the information necessary for bringing the 
claims could not have been found upon diligent effort within that 
timeframe, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the same public policy 
objectives that led to the creation of the discovery rule are advanced by its 
extension to third-party representatives of decedents.38 According to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the discovery rule is driven by public policy 
concerns, and there is large public policy in favor of allowing meritorious 
claims to be heard.39 In contrast, the risk of harm in extending the discovery 
rule to third-party representatives of decedents to the competing public pol-
icy of courts not being bogged down by stale claims is minimal and worth 
the risk.40 Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that allowing 
the discovery rule for direct plaintiffs but not for representatives of dece-
dents in wrongful death suits could affirmatively create public policy 
nightmares, such as motivating tortfeasors to kill victims instead of badly 
injuring them.41 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Id. at 609; see WIS. STAT. § 895.04. 
 37 WIS. STAT. § 893.54(2) (2013–2014); Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 606–07. 
 38 See Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 612. 
 39 See id. at 610. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. at 612. The Wisconsin Supreme Court used the following hypothetical to illustrate 
this point: 
X is killed instantly by a negligent driver in a hit and run accident. X’s beneficiaries 
have at least three years to file a wrongful death claim under Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03, 
895.04, and 895.54(2). Under these hypothetical facts, X could not have brought a 
claim at the time of his death because he did not know the identity of the negligent 
driver. Thus, only a third party would be able to discover the hit and run driver’s 
identity to facilitate a claim. If X’s personal representative or statutory beneficiary 
filed the claim within three years of death, there would be no dispute whatsoever 
about what the decedent knew at the time of death—it would not matter. . . . Under 
the defendant’s theory, if a deceased person’s wrongful death beneficiaries did not 
discover the identity of the hit and run driver until a week after the three-year period 
ended, they would be unable to recover any of the damages enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(4), which are their damages. Conversely, the hit and run driver would be 
rewarded for killing the victim instead of badly injuring him, and he would not have 
to show that the passage of time had created difficulties in defending the case. This 
is not just. 
Id. 
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Survival suits, on the other hand, are brought pursuant to Section 
895.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes.42 Survival suits, unlike wrongful death 
suits, can only be brought to benefit the decedent’s estate.43 Thus, survival 
suits operate on the premise that the third-party representative is able to 
“stand in the shoes” of the decedent in filing the claim.44 
As it found with wrongful death suits, a majority of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court found that extending the discovery rule to third-party representa-
tives of decedents in survival suits does not upset public policy concerns to 
such a degree that the benefits of extending the rule are outweighed.45 Fur-
thermore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found it logically consistent for rep-
resentatives otherwise standing in the shoes of decedents in survival suits to 
similarly benefit from the application of the discovery rule.46 
B. The Preservation of Existing Checks on the Progression of Stale Claims 
To make the decision whether to apply the discovery rule to third-party 
representatives of decedents in wrongful death and survival suits, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court weighed the public policy benefits and detriments of 
the application.47 In deciding that the public policy benefits of extending the 
discovery rule outweigh the detriments, the majority decision noted three 
distinct existing barriers to the progression of stale claims, which it rea-
soned collectively ensure that the public policy benefit of meritorious 
claims being heard outweigh any public policy detriments that exist.48 
First, the discovery rule’s requirement that third-party representatives 
must be diligent in discovering the information necessary for making their 
claims provides a check on stale claims being heard because stale claims are 
more likely to occur when plaintiffs are not diligent in discovering that in-
formation.49 Once a defendant raises the statute of limitations as an affirma-
tive defense the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the information nec-
essary for making the claim was not available upon diligent effort within 
the statute of limitations timeframe.50 
                                                                                                                           
 42 WIS. STAT. § 895.01 (2013–2014) (explaining that a survival suit survives because it is 
considered damage to the person); Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 608. 
 43 Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 608. 
 44 Id. at 613. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. at 615. 
 48 See id. at 615–16. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. at 616. 
34 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
Second, time passage in general is a barrier to stale claims being heard 
because it makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to meet their burden.51 Be-
cause a plaintiff’s burden is not reduced due to time passage, a plaintiff nec-
essarily has a more difficult time winning a case after the statute of limita-
tions has passed.52 
Finally, Wisconsin common law allows for a court to affirmatively re-
fuse to hear a case that it determines, for whatever reason, would “place too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tortfeasor.”53 One factor that could 
place an unreasonable burden on the negligent tortfeasor is the amount of 
time that has elapsed since the running of the statute of limitations.54 Thus, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out that, just because third-party rep-
resentatives of decedents are permitted to extend the statute of limitations 
when they could not have found the information necessary for making their 
claims within that period, this does not mean that a court has an obligation 
to grant the extension.55 
C. The Dissent of Chief Justice Roggensack 
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack em-
phasized that the harm giving rise to wrongful death claims is the death of 
the decedent, and not the potentially unknowable facts that would have been 
relevant to a claim brought by the decedent had the injuries been non-
fatal.56 Thus, even though decedents may have used the discovery rule to 
extend the statute of limitations if they had survived so that they could find 
the facts necessary for making their claims, the fact underlying any wrong-
ful death claim is the indisputably known fact that the decedent died.57 Ad-
ditionally, Chief Justice Roggensack pointed out that the nature of a deriva-
tive action is that representatives of decedents cannot make claims that the 
decedents could not have made had they survived, and the statute of limita-
tions for direct tort victims begins when the injury occurs.58 Thus, the deriv-
ative nature of wrongful death claims bars a representative from benefitting 
from a statute of limitations extension that the decedent could not have ben-
efitted from had the injuries been non-fatal.59 Accordingly, Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. (stating that, generally, “[a] plaintiff will often find that proving his case has be-
come more difficult because time has passed”). 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. at 616 (quoting Cole v. Hubanks, 681 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Wis. 2004)). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. at 620 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting). 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. 
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Roggensack stated that the statute of limitations in wrongful death suits 
should run from the date of the death of the decedent.60 
Regarding survival suits, Chief Justice Roggensack argued that the 
statute of limitations begins running upon the death of the decedent by vir-
tue of the fact that the nature of survival suits is for representatives to 
“‘stand[] in the shoes’” of the decedents, and the statute of limitations for 
decedents would have begun to run, had they not died, at the time they sus-
tained their injuries.61 
Chief Justice Roggensack’s dissent also claimed that the majority erred 
in ignoring previous Wisconsin cases stating that the statute of limitations in 
wrongful death and survival suits begins running upon the death of the dece-
dent.62 Although the majority argued that these cases were inapplicable be-
cause they pre-dated the creation of the discovery rule, Chief Justice 
Roggensack stated that wrongful death and survival suits are simply different 
enough claims from claims brought directly by tort victims that the discovery 
rule did not have the effect of nullifying the holdings of these cases.63 
III. ENSURING COMPENSATION FOR ALL TORT VICTIMS 
The majority’s approach best allows all tort victims to recover damag-
es they are owed because it best preserves the public policy considerations 
behind the creation of the discovery rule.64 The creation of the discovery 
rule was rooted in concerns that tort victims were helpless to recover dam-
ages that they were morally entitled to due to arbitrary legal barriers that 
they could not overcome no matter how diligently they pursued their 
claims.65 For this reason, Wisconsin adopted the discovery rule to allow all 
tort victims the same basic right: to recover damages to make themselves 
whole after suffering injuries through no fault of their own.66 
Although the majority’s decision benefits all tort victims, data suggests 
that the families of blue collar workers killed by the negligence of large 
companies especially benefit from extension of the discovery rule to wrong-
ful death and survival claims because blue collar workers are disproportion-
ately the victims of the torts underlying those claims.67 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. at 618. 
 61 See id. at 622 (quoting Estate of Merrill v. Jerrick, 605 N.W. 2d 645, 650 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
 62 See id. at 618–19. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. at 602, 610, 613 (majority opinion). 
 65 See id. at 612. 
 66 See id. at 610. 
 67 See Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue 
Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 735 (1996) (stating that efforts at so-
called “tort reform” most negatively impact blue collar workers because “[b]lue collar workers 
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The majority correctly understood that wrongful death and survival 
suits brought by third-party representatives of decedents cannot be success-
ful without the discovery of information that may not be available until after 
the statute of limitations runs.68 For this reason, as the majority pointed out, 
the court would indeed be encouraging tortfeasors to kill victims instead of 
badly injuring them if it held that the discovery rule did not apply to wrong-
ful death and survival suits because those tortfeasors would have a better 
chance of escaping liability through the running of the statute of limita-
tions.69 
Chief Justice Roggensack’s dissent misunderstands the point and func-
tion of the discovery rule at the expense of tort victims.70 According to 
Chief Justice Roggensack, the discovery rule should only apply to direct 
tort victims because wrongful death and survival claims of third-party rep-
resentatives of decedents are so closely tied to the claims of direct tort vic-
tims that the two statutes of limitation should begin running at the same 
time.71 However, it is undisputed that the statute of limitations begins run-
ning at the time of the injury.72 Rather, what is disputed is whether the stat-
ute of limitations can be extended by restarting it on the date that the third-
party representative could have found the information necessary for making 
the claim.73 It is unnecessarily confusing and unhelpful to split hairs over 
whether the discovery rule functions by allowing the statute of limitations 
to begin running in the first place on the date that the information necessary 
for making the claim could have been discovered upon diligent effort, or 
whether it allows the statute of limitations to restart to accommodate a 
three-year period after that date.74 
Chief Justice Roggensack misses that the focus, then, is not on when 
the statute of limitations starts, but when it eventually ends.75 The only ar-
gument Chief Justice Roggensack makes on the point that the statute of lim-
itations should not be extended past three years is that there is nothing to 
investigate once the date of the death is known.76 However, information 
                                                                                                                           
predominate in all work-related products liability cases leading to punitive damages”); Lester 
Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There A Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1849 (1992) ( “A typical feature of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ asbestos case 
presentations is an appeal to local prejudice. Defendants are often out-of-state corporations while 
plaintiffs are often blue-collar workers.”). 
 68 See Christ, 866 N.W.2d at 605. 
 69 See id. at 612. 
 70 See id. at 623 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting). 
 71 See id. at 622–23. 
 72 See id. at 606 (majority opinion). 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. at 618 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting). 
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about the tort committed must be introduced to win a wrongful death claim, 
and certainly much more needs to be known than the date of a death.77 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roggensack argued that Wisconsin prece-
dent dictating that wrongful death and survival suits begin running upon the 
date of the death of the decedent should be followed.78 This argument ig-
nores that the creation of the discovery rule was a big enough occurrence 
that reliance on those cases demands explanation beyond the fact that they 
exist, which is all that Chief Justice Roggensack argued.79 
In contrast, the majority correctly concluded that Wisconsin public 
policy dictates that meritorious claims should be heard when the marginal 
threat of stale claims is not overwhelming, which it certainly is not here.80 
The three existing barriers that the majority cites ensure that extension of 
the discovery rule to third-party representatives of decedents in wrongful 
death and survival suits will not open the floodgates for stale claims.81 In-
stead, extension of the discovery rule to third-party representatives of dece-
dents is the only rational way to allow all tort victims to be compensated for 
losses so that they can make themselves whole again.82 
CONCLUSION 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the discovery rule, which ex-
ists to allow statutes of limitation in tort claims to be extended when the 
information necessary for the claims could not have been discovered during 
that period upon diligent effort, should be extended to wrongful death and 
survival suits brought by third-party representatives of decedents. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court’s extension of the discovery rule to third-party repre-
sentatives of decedents in wrongful death and survival suits ensures that all 
tort victims can recover for damages suffered through no fault of their own. 
Though all tort victims benefit from this extension of the discovery rule, the 
families of underprivileged blue collar workers killed due to the negligence 
of large companies nevertheless especially benefit because they are dispro-
portionately affected by the torts giving rise to wrongful death and survival 
claims. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, through Christ v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., has thus sent an important message to all Wisconsin employers, but 
especially to large-scale Wisconsin employers. Through Christ v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., the Wisconsin Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that 
employers cannot escape liability for their torts by reliance on a reading of 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See id. at 616 (majority opinion). 
 78 See id. at 618 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting). 
 79 See id. at 613 (majority opinion). 
 80 See id. at 610. 
 81 See id. at 615–16. 
 82 See id. 
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the statute of limitations in wrongful death and survival suits whereby the 
knowledge of third-party representatives of decedents is irrelevant. 
